Current selves wield all the power in intertemporal tradeoffs. Although one set of future selves will make similar tradeoffs in the future, another self – who we term the cumulative future self – falls on the receiving end of those dictated decisions. How current selves commune with the cumulative future self determines whether the former heed pleas, from the latter, for patience.

In vocational rehabilitation, empowerment is understood as the notion that people should make an active, autonomous choice to find their way back to the labour process. Following this line of reasoning, the concept of empowerment implicitly points to a specific kind of activation strategy, namely labour participation. This activation approach has received criticism for being paternalistic, disciplining and having a one-sided orientation on labour participation. Although we share this theoretical criticism, we want to go beyond it by paying attention to (...) the practical consequences of understanding empowerment as an activation strategy. Inspired by the field of Science and Technology Studies, we will explore the meaning of empowerment and activation in concrete practices of vocational rehabilitation in the Netherlands. Our analysis is based on the narratives of people with a work disability about their lives and the vocational rehabilitation programmes they participated in. We present five illustrative cases that how empowerment is ‘done’ in the practice of vocational rehabilitation and its unintended effects. Our analysis demonstrates that activation strategies seem to be caught in a paradox: instead of including people in society, they have excluding consequences. Vocational rehabilitation professionals can go beyond this paradox by learning from the ways in which empowerment is ‘done’ by clients in vocational rehabilitation programmes. (shrink)

: Jixia Academy is a general term for the Contending academic group in the Pre-Qin Period. The thought derived from Jixia Academy occupies an important part in the development of Chinese ancient ideological history. It has played an important role in regulating and enlightening the construction of the symbolic art of the social order at that time. And it is also of great value to the stability and orderly operation of today’s social order. This paper takes the thought of Jixia (...) Academy as the core. Firstly, it analyzes the general situation of Jixia Academy and its ideological connotation. Secondly, it explores the symbolic art of the Pre-Qin social order, including the characteristics of the Pre-Qin social order and the construction path of the Pre-Qin social order. On this basis, it elaborates the influence of the thought of Jixia Academy on the construction of social order in the Pre-Qin Period, in order to make more people to deeply understand the thought of Jixia Academy and its positive role in the construction of the Pre-Qin social order symbolic art. Resumo: Academia Jixia é um termo geral para o grupo acadêmico Contendo, no período da Dinastia Pré-Qin, e o pensamento derivado da Academia Jixia ocupa uma parte importante no desenvolvimento da história ideológica antiga chinesa. Esse pensamento desempenhou um papel importante na regulação e esclarecimento da construção da arte simbólica da ordem social da época, sendo também de grande valia para a estabilidade e o funcionamento ordenado da ordem social atual. Este artigo toma como núcleo o pensamento da Jixia Academy. Primeiramente, analisa a situação geral da Academia Jixia e sua conotação ideológica. Em segundo lugar, explora a arte simbólica da ordem social Pré-Qin, incluindo as características da ordem social Pré-Qin e o caminho de construção da ordem social pré-Qin. Com base nisso, interpreta a influência do pensamento da Academia Jixia, na construção da ordem social no período Pré-Qin, a fim de levar mais pessoas a compreenderem profundamente o pensamento da Academia Jixia e seu papel positivo, na construção da arte simbólica da ordem social |Pré-Qin. (shrink)

C .H. Waddington was one of the founders of the Theoretical Biology Club at Cambridge in the 1930s whose members advanced a philosophy of biology, “organicism,” that would offer an alternative to the reductionism of mechanistic materialism and the obscurity of vitalism in coming to terms with the dynamic, interdependent, and purposeful character of life. This view was embraced in one form or another by E. S. Russell, John Scott Haldane, C. Lloyd Morgan, Lawrence J. Henderson, C. D. Broad, and (...) Alfred North Whitehead. Waddington, in particular, was devoted to the integration of genetics, development, and evolution within the context of theoretical biology. This article explains the influence of Alfred North Whitehead's philosophy of organism on C. H. Waddington's work. (shrink)

It seems that the reception of Conrad Hal Waddington’s work never really gathered speed in mainstream biology. This paper, offering a transdisciplinary survey of approaches using his epigenetic landscape images, argues that (i) Waddington’s legacy is much broader than is usually recognized—it is widespread across the life sciences (e.g. stem cell biology, developmental psychology and cultural anthropology). In addition, I will show that (ii) there exist as yet unrecognized heuristic roles, especially in model building and theory formation, which Waddington’s images (...) play within his work. These different methodological facets envisioned by Waddington are used as a natural framework to analyze and classify the manners of usage of epigenetic landscape images in post-Waddingtonian ‘landscape approaches’. This evaluation of Waddington’s pictorial legacy reveals that there are highly diverse lines of traditions in the life sciences, which are deeply rooted in Waddington’s methodological work. (shrink)

O artigo analisa a recontextualização da minimal art apresentada pelas teorias do pós-modernismo na arte. Especificamente, analisa o pluralismo crítico dos autores da revista October como Rosalind Krauss e Hal Foster, críticos que recontextualizam o minimalismo e a neovanguarda em direção às práticas do pós-modernismo. A partir dessa recontextualização, serão analisadas as contribuições da fenomenologia e do estruturalismo para o debate sobre a arte minimalista.

In 1992, the United States Supreme Court, in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, upheld the ruling in Roe v. Wade, namely that women have a right “to choose to have an abortion before viability and to obtain it without undue interference from the State.”1 However, since this ruling, some states have imposed regulations that greatly limit this right by restricting access. Texas is a recent example of this. Two proposed restrictions in House Bill 2, which will be discussed (...) in detail below, will force all but eight clinics that are located in metropolitan areas to shut down. The U.S. Supreme Court put the proposed restrictions on hold in October 2014, allowing several clinics to remain open while the restrictions are being appealed in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. If the restrictions are passed, however, those clinics will be forced to shut down and, as a result, many women in Texas will be required to travel more than 100 miles in order to access a safe and legal abortion. Much of the focus of these restrictions has been on women and rightly so. However, I want to turn the attention to physicians. The requirements exacerbate unfair treatment of abortion providers compared with other physicians. Abortion providers face threats from the public—some of which turn into violent attacks—and they are often ostracized by their fellow medical practitioners. There are so few abortion providers to begin with and the proposed requirements limit these physicians’ opportunities to practice the branch of medicine of their choosing. Although the HB 2 requirements may not result in an unconstitutional undue burden on physicians, the challenges created by the bill limit physicians’ abilities to provide abortions. As a result of these limits, HB 2 creates an unconstitutional undue burden for women seeking abortions by creating barriers directed at abortion providers and clinic staff who are willing and able to provide abortions. The first of the two controversial HB 2 requirements is the admitting privileges requirement: “A physician performing or inducing an abortion must, on the date the abortion is performed or induced, have active admitting privileges at a hospital that is located not further than 30 miles from the location at which the abortion is performed or induced.”2 The second requirement is the ambulatory surgical center requirement: “The minimum standards for an abortion facility must be equivalent to the minimum standards adopted under [Texas Health & Safety Code] [...] for ambulatory surgical centres.”3 In order to meet these state-mandated obligations, some abortion clinics would have to spend more than $1 million in upgrades if they wish to remain open. The District Court decided that the ambulatory surgical center requirement places an unconstitutional undue burden on women, and that the two requirements together place an undue burden on women in Texas and especially in the Rio Grande Valley where the nearest clinic is a couple hundred miles away.4 Later, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed the District Court’s decision and argued, “the admitting privileges requirement is constitutional on its face.”5 While the regulations are being appealed, the Supreme Court granted a stay of injunction, allowing about twelve abortion clinics to reopen until a final decision regarding the regulations is made. The District Court ruled that the purpose of the two regulations was to create a substantial obstacle for women seeking abortions in Texas. While the defendants argued that the regulations were designed to make abortions safer and reduce risk, the Court decided that this was not the case. An abortion, especially a first-term abortion, is a very safe procedure and is safer than many other routine surgical procedures. As stated in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, “Unnecessary health regulations that have the purpose or effect of presenting a substantial obstacle to a woman seeking an abortion impose an undue burden on the right.”6 The undue burden in this case is imposed, not through restricting women’s access directly, but by restricting physicians’ freedom to perform abortions. The admitting privileges requirement has reduced the number of physicians who can perform abortions and the ambulatory surgical center requirement has reduced the number of clinics where abortions can be performed. The American Medical Association states, “[t]he Principles of Medical Ethics of the AMA do not prohibit a physician from performing an abortion in accordance with good medical practice and under circumstances that do not violate the law.”7 This means that physicians are not required to perform abortions, except in emergency situations, but can as long as the procedure is done safely and does not violate the law. The new Texas regulations, however, are so restrictive that few abortion providers, limited to only four urban areas, can legally perform abortions. Physicians do not have an absolute right to perform abortions as opposed to women who have an absolute right to have access to an abortion. Physicians do face many challenges that other professionals face in terms of obtaining qualifications and finding work. Abortion providers, however, face challenges that most other physicians do not. The restrictions imposed by these regulations exacerbate unfair treatment toward abortion providers and place further obstacles in their path in terms of providing the service they want and are qualified to provide. Both abortion clinics and abortion providers are being treated differently from other medical clinics and physicians. For instance, “grandfathering of existing facilities and the granting of waivers from specific requirements is prohibited for abortion providers, although other types of ambulatory surgical facilities are frequently granted waivers or are grandfathered.”8 Many abortion clinics cannot afford the necessary upgrades. Furthermore, it is extremely expensive to open a brand new clinic that complies with the ambulatory surgical center requirements. Being grandfathered in would be the only option available to abortion clinics that cannot afford the upgrade. However, unfair treatment of abortion clinics and providers is preventing those clinics from being grandfathered into the new system. As a result, many abortion clinics may be forced to close. Admitting privileges are proving difficult or impossible for physicians both to obtain and, for those who have already been granted privileges, to keep. Dr. Sherwood Lynn, an obstetrician-gynecologist who has performed abortions for decades, describes the process of obtaining admitting privileges and the difficulties abortion providers face. After sending in an application a physician must wait for the hospital to send them the required materials, “but if the address of the practice on the application is of an abortion provider or clinic, [the hospital] won’t send [them] the package of materials required. [They] simply can’t apply.”9 Dr. Lynn and several other physicians have surmised that hospitals are only withholding privileges from qualified physicians who perform abortions and that other physicians do not face this discriminatory treatment. Hospitals have also revoked privileges granted to physicians after learning that the physicians perform abortions. For instance, in Texas two doctors, “received notices [...] informing them that their admitting privileges to the University General Hospital of Dallas have been revoked, with the hospital’s CEO claiming the hospital was unaware they were providing abortion care and that the hospital believed such care would damage its reputation.”10 What is curious about this revocation is that, “federal and state laws [...] forbid hospitals from discriminating against doctors who perform abortions,” and yet hospitals are clearly doing just that.11 Dr. Pamela Richter, another abortion provider in Texas, had her temporary admitting privileges revoked with no explanation and because of this, the clinic where she performed abortions, Reproductive Services, can no longer provide abortions at all.12 As the hospital gave no reason for the revocation, it not clear Dr. Richter’s privileges were revoked because she performs abortions. Dr. Richter, however, has performed over 17,000 abortions and her privileges were revoked soon after HB 2 was introduced.13 According to the Texas Hospital Association, giving admitting privileges to doctors who do not work for the hospital is expensive and time-consuming but this does not account for the fact that hospitals are revoking previously granted privileges from physicians whom they learn are providing abortion services.14 As mentioned previously, the District Court found that the admitting privileges requirement and the ambulatory surgical center requirement do not further ensure the health and safety of women undergoing an abortion. Several physicians have testified to this fact. Dr. Lynn stated in an interview: The admitting privileges requirements are [...] absolutely unnecessary. If you have a number of patients waiting for procedures, and something happens and a patient needs to be transferred to a hospital, you’re not going to leave everyone else and go to the hospital. That makes no sense. You’re going to refer that person to a gynecologist at the hospital. There is no safety issue involved here. If a patient shows up with an emergency, every hospital is required to admit that patient. They have to by law.15 It is rare that complications will arise from an abortion performed in a clinic. Dr. Richter, for example, has performed more than 17,000 abortions and not once had to send a patient to a hospital because of complications resulting from the procedure. According to Dr. Lynn even if abortion providers were granted privileges to hospitals, it is unlikely that they will exercise them. In essence, having admitting privileges at a hospital does nothing to further ensure the safety of an already safe procedure. The only result of the admitting privileges requirement is to limit certain physicians’ ability to perform legal abortions. Not only do the HB 2 requirements fail to further ensure the health and safety of women, the HB 2 requirements may actually create more health risks to women who cannot access the eight remaining clinics. The first risk is that the remaining clinics would have an influx of patients that they may not be able to handle, forcing women to wait longer for an appointment. As stated by the District Court, “[e]ven assuming every woman in Texas who wants an abortion [...] could travel to one of the four metropolitan areas where abortions will still be available, the cumulative results of HB 2 are that, at most, eight providers would have to handle the abortion demand of the entire state.”16 Furthermore, “[t]hat the State suggests that these seven or eight providers could meet the demand of the entire state stretches credulity.”17 Abortion is a time sensitive procedure. It is safest when performed early in a pregnancy. The increase in patients to these remaining clinics, assuming all women in Texas can access them, will increase wait times and may force women to have abortions later in pregnancy. In the worst-case scenario, a woman would not see an abortion provider at all before viability. Such instances may be rare, but they are possible. In such cases, women’s access to legal abortions becomes impossible and thereby violate the ruling in Roe. Clinics may be able to avoid the aforementioned problems if they hire more physicians. However, there are two barriers to hiring more physicians. First, as mentioned previously, admitting privileges to Texas hospitals are difficult, if not impossible, for abortion providers to obtain. Second, given the negative treatment of abortion providers by anti-abortion groups, many physicians are not willing to perform abortions. The harassment abortion providers face is unique to those physicians and many physicians will not perform abortions for that reason. In an article published in the Austin Chronicle, anti- abortion activist Abby Johnson, “discusses how her group investigated appraisal district records to find the new location of where an Austin abortion physician plans to work.”18 Johnson states, “These abortionists are feeling the pressure from the pro-life movement in Texas. I think they feel like they’re on the run. And that’s how we want to keep it.”19 If the HB 2 requirements are passed and there remain at most eight abortion providers in Texas, these activists will concentrate on those clinics and, “the dangerous impact of their intimidation tactics will be exacerbated.”20 Even if the number of physicians needed to meet the demand in Texas can obtain admitting privileges and work at one of the remaining clinics, they may choose not to do such work because they are putting themselves at risk. The harm abortion providers face from such anti-abortion groups is not unique to Texas. There are stories from all over the country and from other countries where abortion is legal of physicians receiving death threats. Dr. George Tiller, an abortion provider in Kansas, was killed outside his church and had received numerous death threats prior to this. The HB 2 requirements are making it so that abortion providers either cannot provide their services any longer or will face increased threats and increased danger to themselves. Physicians are allowed to conscientiously object to providing medical interventions in certain circumstances for moral and religious reasons. However, there are limits on this right. According to the American Congress of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, “[w]hen conscientious refusals conflict with moral obligations that are central to the ethical practice of medicine, ethical care requires that the physician provide care despite reservations or that there be resources in place to allow the patient to gain access to care in the presence of conscientious refusal.”21 I would argue fear for one’s safety in the face of immediate threats is perhaps a stronger ground on which to refuse to provide care than a personal belief that abortion is immoral or against one’s religion. ACOG also states, “[p]roviders with moral or religious objections should either practice in proximity to individuals who do not share their views or ensure that referral processes are in place so that patients have access to the service that the physician does not wish to provide.”22 This responsibility has been largely disputed by the medical community but in cases of rape, incest, and health risks to women, referrals must be made without exception. However, under the requirements of HB 2, working in proximity to an abortion provider may not be possible because they are so geographically limited. Referrals are supposed to be made within reason. Some areas of Texas, such as the Rio Grande Valley, are up to 200 miles away from the nearest clinic that would remain open if HB 2 is passed. Referrals may simply not be feasible given the geographical distances and the decreasing number of available physicians. As mentioned above, there are two risks to the health and safety of women as a result of HB 2. The second of these is that if a woman cannot access one of the remaining clinics, she may seek out a more convenient but illegal and unsafe abortion, which is far more likely to result in a dangerous complication. Dr. Lynn states, “[b]ecause of the restrictions lawmakers impose, women will seek abortions illegally, and we’re going to see a rise in septic abortions.”23 Some areas of Texas might effectively revert back to a pre-Roe era where abortions were performed in unsanitary conditions by unqualified people resulting in dangerous medical complications far more often than legal abortion procedures do now. Physicians like Dr. Lynn who want to prevent this from happening generally cannot do so without facing legal sanction. Physicians have a duty to provide safe medical care and if they cannot obtain admitting privileges, they cannot exercise this duty. ACOG released a statement expressing their objections to the new requirements. They state that HB 2 is, “plainly intended to restrict the reproductive rights of women in Texas through a series of requirements that improperly regulate medical practice and interfere with the patient-physician relationship.”24 Executive Vice-President of ACOG, Hal C. Lawrence III stated: The Texas bills set a dangerous precedent of a legislature telling doctors how to practice medicine and how to care for individual patients. ACOG opposes legislative interference, and strongly believes that decisions about medical care must be based on scientific evidence and made by licensed medical professionals, not the state or federal government.25 Abortion is one of only a few areas of medicine where the legislature imposes so many regulations restricting particular physicians’ ability to practice medicine. Not only are abortions providers being regulated by the state, they are also facing clear discrimination from others within the medical community. The state is closing down clinics that do not meet the ambulatory surgical center requirements and hospitals are denying physicians admitting privileges because they perform abortions. In summary, abortion providers are being discriminated against both by the legislature and other members of the medical community. Other physicians who do not perform abortions are not denied admitting privileges on discriminatory grounds. Clinics that cannot afford upgrades to become an ambulatory surgical center are being grandfathered in, while abortion clinics are being forced to close down. Ob-Gyns who conscientiously object to performing abortions and who are not located in close proximity to at least one abortion provider cannot effectively fulfill their duty to refer patients. Lastly, given the barriers these regulations will create, there will likely be a rise in complications resulting from abortions provided under grossly unsafe conditions. Physicians, whose duty it is to provide safe and effective medical care, are being denied the right to exercise this duty. While this denial may not be unconstitutional, it is certainly unjust and discriminatory and creates obstacles that other physicians do not face. Most importantly, these obstacles are creating an undue burden for women. The HB 2 requirements do not increase the health and safety of abortions; all they do is create substantial obstacles for women. In light of these observations, the requirements seem to me to be in clear violation of Casey, in which it was decided that, “[u]nnecessary health regulations that have the purpose or effect of presenting a substantial obstacle to a woman seeking an abortion impose an undue burden on that right.”26 These regulations do just what Casey was meant to prohibit and this is accomplished through limiting physicians’ ability to practice safe abortions across the state of Texas. Therefore, the HB 2 requirements may not impose an undue burden on doctors but they do impose an undue burden on women. PDF available: Rachel Hill, "Texas HB 2," Voices in Bioethics. References: 1 Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, pg. 2. 2 Whole Women’s Health v. Lakey, pg. 2. 3 Ibid. 4 Ibid., 4. 5 Ibid., 2. 6 Planned Parenthood v. Casey, pg. 16 7 AMA Code of Medical Ethics, “Opinion 2.01 – Abortion,” American Medical Association. 8 Whole Women’s Health v. Lakey, pg. 10. 9 Dr. Sherwood Lynn, “A Texas Ob-Gyn Details the Horrific Consequences of Abortion Restrictions,” Cosmopolitan. 10 Feminist Newswire, “Texas Hospitals Revoke Admitting Privileges to Abortion Providers,” Feminist Majority Foundation Blog. 11 Ibid. 12 Ibid. 13 Ibid. 14 Glenn Hegar, “Texas Hospital Association’s Statement of Opposition to Section 2 of the Committee Substitute for Senate Bill 5,” Texas Hospital Association. 15 Dr. Lynn, “A Texas Ob-Gyn.” 16 Whole Women’s Health v. Lakey, pg. 10. 17 Ibid. 18 Mary Tuma, “Undercover Audio Reveals Anti-Abortion Tactics: Anti-abortion activists monitor and track providers, patients,” Austin Chronicle. 19 Ibid. 20 Ibid. 21 Committee on Ethics, “The Limits of Conscientious Refusal in Reproductive Medicine,” The American Congress of Obstetricians and Gynecologists. 22 Ibid. 23 Dr. Lynn, “A Texas Ob-Gyn.” 24 “Ob-Gyns Denounce Texas Abortion Legislation: Senate Bill 1 and House Bill 2 Set Dangerous Precedent,” The American Congress of Obstetricians and Gynecologists. 25 Ibid. 26 Planned Parenthood v. Casey, pg. 16. (shrink)

Distributional models of semantics learn word meanings from contextual co‐occurrence patterns across a large sample of natural language. Early models, such as LSA and HAL (Landauer & Dumais, 1997; Lund & Burgess, 1996), counted co‐occurrence events; later models, such as BEAGLE (Jones & Mewhort, 2007), replaced counting co‐occurrences with vector accumulation. All of these models learned from positive information only: Words that occur together within a context become related to each other. A recent class of distributional models, referred to as (...) neural embedding models, are based on a prediction process embedded in the functioning of a neural network: Such models predict words that should surround a target word in a given context (e.g., word2vec; Mikolov, Sutskever, Chen, Corrado, & Dean, 2013). An error signal derived from the prediction is used to update each word's representation via backpropagation. However, another key difference in predictive models is their use of negative information in addition to positive information to develop a semantic representation. The models use negative examples to predict words that should not surround a word in a given context. As before, an error signal derived from the prediction prompts an update of the word's representation, a procedure referred to as negative sampling. Standard uses of word2vec recommend a greater or equal ratio of negative to positive sampling. The use of negative information in developing a representation of semantic information is often thought to be intimately associated with word2vec's prediction process. We assess the role of negative information in developing a semantic representation and show that its power does not reflect the use of a prediction mechanism. Finally, we show how negative information can be efficiently integrated into classic count‐based semantic models using parameter‐free analytical transformations. (shrink)

The Theme. Strong forcing axioms like Martin’s Maximum give a reasonably satisfactory structural analysis of $H(\omega _2)$. A broad program in modern Set Theory is searching for strong forcing axioms beyond $\omega _1$. In other words, one would like to figure out the structural properties of taller initial segments of the universe. However, the classical techniques of forcing iterations seem unable to bypass the obstacles, as the resulting forcings axioms beyond $\omega _1$ have not thus far been strong enough! However, (...) with his celebrated work on generalised side conditions, I. Neeman introduced us to a novel paradigm to iterate forcings. In particular, he could, among other things, reprove the consistency of the Proper Forcing Axiom using an iterated forcing with finite supports. In 2015, using his technology of virtual models, Veličković built up an iteration of semi-proper forcings with finite supports, hence reproving the consistency of Martin’s Maximum, an achievement leading to the notion of a virtual model.In this thesis, we are interested in constructing forcing notions with finitely many virtual models as side conditions to preserve three uncountable cardinals. The thesis constitutes six chapters and three appendices that amount to 118 pages, where Section 1 is devoted to preliminaries, and Section 2 is a warm-up about the scaffolding poset of a proper forcing. In Section 3, we present the general theory of virtual models in the context of forcing with sets of models of two types, where we, e.g., define the “meet” between two virtual models and prove its properties.The main results are joint with Boban Veličković, and partly appeared in Guessing models and the approachability ideal, J. Math. Log. 21 (2021).Pure Side Conditions. In Section 4, we use two types of virtual models (countable and large non-transitive ones induced by a supercompact cardinal, which we call Magidor models) to construct our forcing with pure side conditions. The forcing covertly uses a third type of models that are transitive. We also add decorations to the conditions to add many clubs in the generic $\omega _2$. In contrast to Neeman’s method, we do not have a single chain, but $\alpha $ -chains, for an ordinal $\alpha $ with $V_\alpha \prec V_\lambda $. Thus, starting from suitable large cardinals $\kappa <\lambda $, we construct a forcing notion whose conditions are finite sets of virtual models described earlier. The forcing is strongly proper, preserves $\kappa $, and has the $\lambda $ -Knaster property. The relevant quotients of the forcing are strongly proper, which helps us prove strong guessing model principles. The construction is generalisable to a ${<}\mu $ -closed forcing, for any given cardinal $\mu $ with $\mu ^{<\mu }=\mu <\kappa $.The Iteration Theorem. In Section 5, we use the forcing with pure side conditions to iterate a subclass of proper and $\aleph _2$ -c.c. forcings and obtain a forcing axiom at the level of $\aleph _2$. The iterable class is closely related to Asperó–Mota’s forcing axiom for finitely proper forcings.Guessing Model Principles. Section 6 encompasses the main parts of the thesis. We prove the consistency of the guessing principle $\mathrm {GMP}^+(\omega _3,\omega _1)$ that states for any cardinal ${\theta \geq \omega _3}$, the set of $\aleph _2$ -sized elementary submodels M of $H(\theta )$, which are the union of an $\omega _1$ -continuous $\in $ -chain of $\omega _1$ -guessing, I.C. models is stationary in $\mathcal P_{\omega _3}(H(\theta ))$. The consistency and consequences of this principle are demonstrated in the following diagram. We also prove that one can obtain the above guessing models in a way that the $\omega _1$ -sized $\omega _1$ -guessing models remain $\omega _1$ -guessing model in any outer transitive model with the same $\omega _1$, and we denote this principle by $\rm{SGMP}^+(\omega_3,\omega_1)$.In the following diagram, $\mathrm{TP}$ stands for the tree property; $w\mathrm{KH}$ stands for the weak Kurepa Hypothesis; $\mathrm{MP}$ stands for Mitchell property, i.e., the approachability ideal is trivial modulo the nonstationary ideal; $\mathrm{AP}$ stands for the approachability property; $\mathrm {AMTP}(\kappa ^+)$ states that if $2^\kappa <\aleph _{\kappa ^+}$, then every forcing which adds a new subset of $\kappa ^+$ whose initial segments are in the ground model, collapses some cardinal $\leq 2^{\kappa }$. The dotted arrow denotes the relative consistency, while others are logical implications.Appendices. Appendix A includes merely the above diagram. Appendix B presents a proof of the Mapping Reflection Principle with finite conditions under $\mathrm {PFA}$. Appendix C contains open problems. Finally, the thesis’s bibliography consists of 42 items.Abstract prepared by Rahman MohammadpourE-mail: [email protected]: https://theses.hal.science/tel-03209264. (shrink)

Çocuk evliliği, tarih boyunca farklı toplumlarda bilinen ve uygulanan sosyal bir olgu olsa da son zamanlarda, modern duyarlılıkları giderek daha fazla rahatsız eden bir hal almıştır. Son iki asır öncesine kadar, Avrupa hukuki düşüncesinde çocuklar yargı önünde farklı bir muamele görmelerine imkan veren istisnai bir statüye sahip değildi. Diğer taraftan, İslam hukukunun çocuklara, özel bir hukuki statü kazandırma konusunda bazı öncü adımlar attığını söyleyebiliriz. Nitekim, en eski İslam hukuku kitaplarının bile, insanın fiziksel ve zihinsel gelişim aşamalarına ve her bir aşamada (...) ortaya çıkan hukuki hükümlere dair son derece teknik ayrıntılarla dolu olduğunu görebiliriz. Ancak çocuk hakları konusundaki bu erken farkındalığa rağmen, çocuk evliliği olgusu hem İslam toplumlarında hem de İslam hukukunda kendini gösterebilmiştir. Çünkü, İslam çocuk hukuku, ilk ortaya çıktığı dönemin kültürel şartlarından ciddi şekilde etkilenmiştir. Üstelik bu kültürel şartlar, İslam dünyası boyunca İslam çocuk hukukunun temel zemini olma işlevini sürdüre gelmiştir. Bu çalışma, alimlerin çocuk evliliğini delillendirmek üzere yapageldikleri bazı aşırı yorumları ortaya koymaya ve konuyla ilgili âyetleri metinsel bağlamıyla daha uyumlu bir şekilde okumaya çalışmaktadır.Özet: Her bağlam için geçerli olabilecek, standart bir çocuk tanımı yapmak göründüğünden daha güçtür. Bu nedenle çocuk araştırmaları sahasında çalışan akademisyenlerin, muhtelif sosyal disiplinler tarafından yapılacak herhangi bir çocuk tarifi konusunda memnuniyetsizlik içinde olması doğaldır. Diğer yandan, İslam hukukunda baştan beri ayrıntılı bir çocuk hukuku teorisi mevcuttur. İslam hukuk düşüncesinde, insanlar doğum ile yetişkinlik arasındaki gelişim döneminde üç aşamadan geçerler: Çocukluk (küçüklük), buluğ ve rüşt. Bütün fıkıh mezhepleri, insanın doğumu ile ergenliği arasındaki dönemde küçük çocuk sayılacağı kanaatindedirler. Bu çocukların mallarının en iyi şekilde idare edilebilmesi için yasal temsilcileri bulunmak zorundadır. Fakîhler çocuğun velisinin, özellikle de baba veya baba tarafından dedenin, velâyeti altındaki küçük çocuklar üzerinde mücbir bir yetkisi olduğu (velâyet-i mücbire) konusunda geniş bir fikir birliğine sahiptirler. Buna göre veliler, velâyetleri altında bulunan çocukları uygun gördükleri kişilerle evlendirme yetkisine de sahiptirler. Fakat zaman zaman beşik kertmesi olarak da anılan bu uygulama bir ön sözleşmeden ibarettir. Yani bu sözleşme doğrudan doğruya fiziksel boyutları da olan müşterek bir evlilik hayatını meşru kılmamaktadır. Çünkü cinsel hayatın ancak buluğdan sonra gerçekleşmesi ön görülmektedir. Modernite öncesi İslam tarihi boyunca, İbn Şubrume (ö. 144/761), Ebû Bekr el-Esamm (ö. 200/816) ve Osman el-Bettî (ö. 143/760) gibi bir kaç fakih dışında küçük çocukların evlenmesine kategorik olarak karşı çıkan kimselere pek rast gelinmemektedir.Hanefi mezhebinde, herhangi bir zihinsel özrü olmaksızın buluğa eren erkek ve kız çocuklar evlilik konusunda mücbir velâyetin kapsamı dışına çıkarlar. Bu, evlilik sözleşmelerini bizzat gerçekleştirebilecekleri anlamına gelmektedir. Fakat veli, uygunsuz bulduğu evliliğe karşı dava açarak bunu yargı yoluyla geçersiz kılma yoluna gidebilir. Diğer üç Sunnî mezhep ise erkek ve kız çocuklar arasında bir ayrım yapar: Buluğa eren erkek kendi evlilik akdini yapabilme hakkını elde ederken aynı durumdaki kız çocuklar velâyet altında kalmaya devam ederler. Şâfiʿî mezhebine göre, velâyeti gerekli kılan illet (bekaret) hâlâ geçerliliğini korumaktadır. Dolayısıyla veli, kızları evlendirme konusundaki icbâri yetkisini elinde tutmaya devam etmektedir. Bu durumda kızın rızasının alınması, akdin geçerliliği için şart olmaktan ziyade sadece nezaket gereğidir. Rüşte ulaşmak veya fizyolojik olgunlaşma sürecini tamamlamak ise İslam hukukunda evlilik için şart görülmemiştir.Modern zamanlara kadar geleneksel İslam hukukunun erken evlilik lehinde gösterdiği bu yaklaşımda herhangi bir değişiklik olmamıştır. 1917 yılında çıkan Hukuk-ı Aile Kararnamesi daha önce benzeri görülmemiş bir dizi düzenleme getirmiştir: İlk olarak, evlilik yaşı erkek için on sekiz kız için ise on yedi olarak belirlenmiştir. On sekiz yaşın altındaki erkeklerin hakimden evlenme izni alması; on yedi yaşından küçük kızların ise hem veli onayı hem de hakim iznine sahip olması zorunlu hale getirilmiştir. On iki yaşın altındaki erkekler ile dokuz yaşından küçük kızların ise asla evlendirilemeyeceği kararlaştırılmıştır.Mantıkî bağlam ve sentaktik yapı elverişli olmamasına rağmen fakihler çocuk evliliğini desteklemek üzere bazı Kur’ân âyetlerine (Nisâ 4/3-6, Nisâ 4/127, Talâk 65/4) referansta bulunmuşlardır. Makale içeriğinde detaylı şekilde açıklandığı üzere zorlama yorumlamalarda bulunmuşlardır. Bu makale, söz konusu âyetlere daha tutarlı bir yorum getirmeye çalışmaktadır. Aynı şekilde, Kur’an’ın çocuk evliliğini kolaylaştırıcı bir tavır içerisinde olmadığını, çocukların evlendirilebilmesi yönündeki yaklaşımların tarihsel ve kültürel şartlara bağlı olarak yapılan bazı zorlama yorumlara dayandığını ileri sürmektedir.Hz. ʿÂişe’nin Hz. Peygamber ile oldukça erken bir yaşta evlendiğine dair nakledilen rivâyet de konuyla ilgili olarak ileri sürülen başka bir argümandır. Bu rivâyetin sahih olduğuna inanılmaktadır. Buna rağmen ilginç bir şekilde bu rivâyet çok az fakih tarafından kullanılmıştır. Bunun sebebi, fakîhlerin Hz. Peygamberin mahremiyetinden bahsetmek istememeleri olabilir. Rivâyetin hücciyeti konusuna kuşkuya kapılmış olmaları da mümkündür. Söz konusu rivâyete daha yakından bakıldığında, ifadedeki menfi üslup hemen dikkat çekmektedir. Çünkü rivâyette Hz. ʿÂişe, Hz. Peygamberle evlendiği günü anlatırken sürekli olarak fizyolojik ve psikolojik açıdan olumsuz koşullardan bahsetmektedir. Nitekim Hz. ʿÂişe birden bire oynamakta olduğu salıncaktan alınmakta ve kendisinin de bilmediği bir yere doğru götürülmektedir. Rivâyet, sadece çocuk evliliğinin cevazını ortaya koymakla yetinmemekte, sanki aynı zamanda çocukların uygunsuz koşullardaki evlilik taleplerine bile itaatkar olmaları gerektiğini salık vermektedir. İçerik yanında teknik olarak bakıldığında bu rivâyet, haber-i vâhiddir. Çünkü rivâyet, sadece Hz. ʿÂişe tarafından bilinebilecek detayları içermektedir. Tarihî açıdan bir öneme sahip olmasına rağmen dinî hükümlere kanıt olma niteliğinden yoksundur. Çünkü bu rivâyette, râvi konuyla ilgili Hz. Peygamber’e ait resmi bir açıklamayı nakletmemekte; sadece kendi zaviyesinden maruz kaldığı bir durumdan bahsetmektedir. (shrink)

Unlike Hanafī jurists, most of the jurists maintain that qiyās is permissible (jāʿiz) for the origins (aṣl) in which the qiyās rule is invalid, including ruhsat (permission); kaffarah (expiation) and ḥadd (penalties). Shāfiʿī jurists, Imam al-Shāfiʿī and his followers like al-Juwaynī, argue that Hanafī jurists are contradictory since they apply qiyās in many cases despite their judgment that qiyās is invalid, and on the contrary they defend that these are derived from the literal interpretation techniques out of qiyās format. Nevertheless, (...) Shāfiʿī jurists persist that they rule on the qiyās applications through Islamic jurisprudence inference methods (istinbāt) such as Islamic juristic preference (istiḥsān), even beyond qiyās. In his sense of search effective cause: ʿilla (taʿlil), al-Juwaynī focuses on the proper meaning/suitability (munāsaba). He runs the mechanism of taʿlil even in the presence of the deepest proper meaning. He customizes the formulation of the suitability (munāsaba)/proper meaning for the origins in which the qiyās’ rule is invalid. Kaffarah and ḥadd consequently expand the validity area and minimize the restricted area for qiyās. Al-Juwaynī’s approach agrees to his rational personality as well as the value that he appreciates for qiyās. In this paper, the aim of study is to identify the borders and limitations of qiyās in al-Juwaynī’s thought with discussions about the disagreements between the jurists in the specified areas.Summary: As a general principle, devoting (taʿabbud) is the foundation for jurisprudence for al-Imām al-Shāfiʿī and reasoning (taʿaqqul/taʿlīl) for Abu Hanīfa. Despite this, Abu Hanīfa and Hanafī jurists consider non-qiyās foundations (ma’dul bih ‘anil-qiyās) including the quantified ordinances (muqaddarāt/taqdīrat) and ruhsat (permission) as well as kaffarah (expiation) and ḥadd (penalty) as the banned areas for the analogy (qiyās) and profess that qiyās cannot be applied in these areas. It may be contradictory that they state in one hand that the foundation of rulings is taʿaqqul, and on the other hand, bars the above-mentioned areas for qiyās. On the contrary to their general approach, Shāfiʿī jurists, in particular, argue that it is untrue to absolutely exclude use of analogy in those areas, which are rather open to qiyās. Al-Imām al-Shāfiʿī and one of his followers, al-Juwaynī, describe that Hanafī jurists’ applications do not jibe with their principles so that they do refer the inference methods (istinbāt) (e.g. juristic preference: istiḥsān), furthering qiyās although they take qiyās as illicit in kaffarah and ḥadd. However, Hanafī jurists defend that they are not in a contradiction, and indeed they do not apply qiyās in kaffarah and ḥadd and derive their illations mostly from textual implications (dalālah) that are mostly out of qiyās format such as tanqīh al-maʿnā (isolating ʿilla), istidlāl, and dalālah al-naṣṣ (inferred meaning). As understood from the relevant arguments, applying qiyās in these areas is directly associated with the issue of potentiality for “the analogy in reason.” The type of qiyās that Hanafī jurists consider illicit in kaffarah and ḥadd is the analogical actions made for the reasons. One of the most rationalist representatives of Shāfiʿī uṣūl, al-Juwaynī pronounces that the method to determine ʿilla (cause) is fundamentally the suitability (munāsaba) that can be defined as “rational compatibility.” In his opinion, the ratiocination (taʿlīl) is based on this suitability. According to him, the indications of qiyās will be clear or it becomes practicable even in the presence of low-level, implicit suitability. Al-Juwaynī considers that it is licit to apply the analogy for the kaffarah and ḥadd as well as the non-qiyās foundations, including ruhsat and muqaddarāt or taqdīrat, whether direct or explicit (i.e. the meaning of analogy: qiyās al-maʿnā) or indirect or implicit (i.e. the commonality of analogy: qiyās al-shabah). In this context, one of Juwayni’s concern is “the matter of inherence in textual sources such as naṣṣ or the Qur’ān and the Sunna),” corresponding to the area where the judgment is based on a specific reason by naṣṣ. For him, a number of reasonable meanings can be inferred in these areas when it is critiqued independent of the uttered words. But the inherence mentioned in the texts of naṣṣ, indicates to avoid the use of analogy for making a judgment. Al-Juwaynī asserts that some fractional elaborate or detailed meanings cannot be obtained for physical prayers and only a set of universal meanings can be imagined. He defines that it is permissible to compare the reasons of physical worshipping with each other when any suitable meaning is present. He considers that for the permissibility of qiyās in ruhsat, it is adequate to find a meaning suitable for the judgment, and besides, the commonality of analogy (qiyās al-shabah) is applicable in the area of muqaddarāt or taqdīrat. Nevertheless, a patient’s condition is similar to that of a traveller in terms of ruhsat for not fasting (ṣavm). In al-Juwaynī’s way of thinking, patients should act like travellers for ruhsat to shorten (qaṣr) the prayers (ṣalāh) due to “requiring” as a proper meaning. However, as mentioned by al-Juwaynī, there is a consensus (ʿijmā or ittifāq) on the fact that a patient cannot shorten his or her prayers. Due to this impediment, it is understood that the rule of shortening their prayers (ṣalāh) is permissible for travellers but not for patients (manʿ al-ʿijmā’).In criminal cases, the right of oath before the court is belonging to the defendant, whereas to the claimant in kasāme, an oath method in unidentified murders. Taking an oath from the claimant is merely inherent to the kasāme application. Al-Juwaynī states that this inherence is known by the principle of being inherent to each circumstance (iḥtisās bi-l hāl), and with this aspect, kasāme is a closed area for qiyās. According to al-Juwaynī, contracts are suitable for qiyās because they have conditions such as offers and agreements explicitly stating the quality and quantity, and mutual assent. He describes that these are the reasons unavailable for qiyās with respect to their characteristics. With this, the contracts are among the reasonable sources in one respect and the unreasonable in another respect. Consequently, al-Juwaynī suggests that the analogy loses its functionality or validity in a limited number of the closed areas for qiyās, which are the static devotional judgments (taʿabbud) having no proper meaning, direct or indirect, or explicit or implicit; the areas where the judgment is made inherent to a specific reason by the naṣṣ (ihtisās bi-l-nass) (as in the example that sacrificing a female goat at the age of less than one year is a specific judgment for Burde b. Niyār). The point leads to the judgment is made inherent to a specific reason by the principle of ihtisās bi-hāl; and banned ʿijmā issues (as in the example of ʿijmā that it is agreed on the fact that patients cannot shorten (qaṣr) their prayers (ṣalāh), unlike travellers. Al-Juwaynī sees the application of qiyās as licit based on the availability of suitable meaning in all areas except for the above-mentioned issues. That he minimizes the closed areas for qiyās and widely expands the functionality of analogy is the reflections of the value that he gives to qiyās. (shrink)

Tim Ingold is known in contemporary Anglophone social anthropology to be an original thinker who dares to think outside the mainstream of the discipline. His anthropological works are philosophically informed and heavily influenced by phenomenology. They account for and pay heed to “life,” to the dynamism taking place in all the observed things, including non-living beings. Central to his anthropology of life is the notion of wayfaring. This article purports to introduce this notion and to explore the challenges, implications and (...) inspirations it has for philosophy while taking a critical stand towards Ingold’s account. It argues that the notion envisions citizens who have strong civic ties but at the same time can empathise with people of other countries. It argues furthermore that Ingold’s critique of philosophy as embedded in such a notion can serve as an inspiration for doing philosophy in a more fruitful way, i.e., doing philosophy as wayfaring. Keywords: Wayfaring, logic of inversion, meshwork, armchair approach, philosophy-as-a-wayfaring. Abstrak: Tim Ingold dikenal sebagai seorang antropolog sosial Anglofon kontemporer yang memiliki pemikiran orisinal dan berani berpikir di luar arus utama disiplin ilmunya. Karya-karya antropologisnya adalah karya yang melek filsafat and sangat dipengaruhi oleh fenomenologi. Karya-karya tersebut peka terhadap “kehidupan,” terhadap dinamika yang berlangsung pada setiap hal yang diamati, termasuk keberadaan yang tidak hidup. Salah satu konsep penting dalam pemikiran antropologisnya adalah pengembaraan. Dalam artikel ini penulis bermaksud memperkenalkan konsep tersebut serta mengeksplorasi tantangan, implikasi, dan inspirasinya terhadap filsafat sambil mengritik beberapa klaim Ingold. Penulis berpendapat bahwa konsep tersebut menawarkan sebuah visi tentang warga negara yang memiliki identitas sipil dan ikatan antarwarga yang kuat, namun pada saat yang sama memiliki empati terhadap warga negeri lain. Selain itu, penulis melihat kritik yang dilancarkan Ingold terhadap filsafat sebagai sebuah inspirasi dan undangan untuk mencari jalan menuju sebuah cara berfilsafat yang lebih merunduk ke bumi dan berbela rasa: berfilsafat sebagai sebuah pengembaraan bersama dengan yang-lain dan penuh empati terhadap yang-lain. Kata kunci: kembara, logika inversi, rajutan-jejaring-relasi-bersimpul-terbuka, pendekatan belakang-meja, filsafat-sebagai-kembara. (shrink)

Amartya Sen introduces the concept of capabilities, i.e. what people are able to do and to be, as a non-economic measure in the development evaluation. This essay seeks to explore how this concept deals with the issues of values and politics, which in many cases determines people’s identity. The main argument is that the concept of capabilities is built around a certain individualistic view of human beings, whereas identity suggests a more complex picture. As such, Sen’s capability approach cannot properly (...) address the issue of identity and risks losing important insights which may contribute to people’s well being. Keywords: Amartya Sen, capability approach, identity, development, justice. Abstrak: Amartya Sen memperkenalkan konsep kapabilitas, yakni apa yang dapat dilakukan oleh seseorang dan bagaimana ia dapat menjadi dirinya, sebagai tolok ukur non-ekonomik dalam evaluasi pembangunan. Artikel ini berupaya mengkaji bagaimana konsep ini dapat diselaraskan dengan nilai-nilai identitas dan politik, yang dalam banyak hal menentukan apa yang dianggap oleh banyak orang sebagai nilai. Argumen yang dikemukakan dalam artikel ini adalah bahwa konsep mengenai kapabilitas dibangun atas sebuah pandangan individualistik mengenai manusia, sementara identitas menyiratkan sebuah gambaran yang lebih kompleks. Dipahami secara demikian, pendekatan kapabilitas Sen tidak dapat menanggapi permasalahan identitas secara memadai dan beresiko kehilangan insight penting yang justru dapat memberi sumbangan bagi kesejahteraan manusia. Kata-kata kunci: Amartya Sen, pendekatan kapabilitas, identitas, perkembangan, keadilan. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:PLOTINUS AND THE APEIRON OF PLATO'S PARMENIDES JOHN H. HEISER Niagara Unwersity Niagara University, New York WE USE THE TERM "infinite" so freely to designate what supposedly transcends something called ' the finite " that one might imagine the concept to be entirely unproblematic. Greek philosophy's difficulty even entertaining such an idea then appears as a sort of myopia, which we in our superior enlightenment have escaped. I propose (...) to examine the way in which one Greek mind, that of Hotinus, came to entertain rthe idea. There may be no better wiay to bring out the difficulties, as well as the possibilities, inherent in a concept than to observe a first class philosophical mind wrestling with it. I also hope rto show that we have a lot to learn from Plotinus. Plotinus's doctrine of the infinite has of course been examined before, on more than one occasion.1 But those who have done so, judging from what they say or do not say, appear to find nothing puzzling in the concept of " infinite perfection " or" infinite being." "We" have come to understand exactly what it means (or at least we bandy the term about 1 For instance: A. H. Armstrong, "Plotinus' Doctrine of the Infinite and its Significance for Christian Thought," Downside Review 73 (1955) : 47-58; Leo J. Sweeney, S.J., "Infinity in Plotinus," Gregorianum 38 (1957) : 515535 ; 713-732; W. Norris Clarke, S.J., "Infinity in Plotinus: a Reply,'' Gregorianum 40 (1959): 75-98; John Whittaker, "Philological Comments on the Neoplatonic Notion of Infinity,'' in The Significance of Neoplatonism, ed. R. Baine Harris (Norfolk, Va.: International Society for Neoplatonic Studies, 1976), pp. 155-172. John M. Rist devotes the third chapter, "The Plotinian One," of his Plotinus: The Road to Reality (New York: Cambridge Uninrsity Press, 1967) largely to the infinity of the One. 58 54 JOHN H. HEISER as if we did). Greek difficulties are understandable (ailthough it is hal'd not to be patronizing about them), but once we have taken note of these difficulties the only question of interest would seem to be whether Plotinus learned to discount them and to talk as we do. In my view, the only way to appreciate Plotinus's aichievement, and to learn from him, is to take these difficulties with great seriousness and to stmggle through them with Plotinus. Another point most commentators overlook is something I take to be both a frucit and a clue to much of what Plotinus says about the Infinite Source of the universe. This is that, in explaining why the One should be called " infinite," Plotinu!! is presenting his e:xiegesis of a perplexing passage in Plato's Parmenides.2 Rather than following his own 1ine of thought to the conc1usion that the One must be infinite, we see Plotinus casting about for some meaning he can assign to a term he is confronted with. I happen to think that his exegesis of Plato is mistaken. This raises the interesting possibility that Plotinus 's breakthrough, if it is a breakthrough and not an aberration, resulted by accident from a mis.take. Before examining Greek views on the infinite, I should like to play Socrates for a moment and examine the concept itself of " infinite perfection." A bit of dialectic might help dispel some of the complacency that surrounds it. As it stands, "infinitely perfect" is at least verbally self-contradictory, as if one were to say " endlessly finished." This may explain why even Plotinus never put it quite thaJt way. But even if we can get around that, what could it mean for something to be 2 :M:ost commentators simply ignore the point, but Professor Armstrong, who is usually so alert to sources, makes the surprising statement that "there is no clear evidence that Plato ever thought or spoke of the One or Good as in any sense apeiron" ("Doctrine of the Infinite," p. 48). Professor Rist goes further and claims that "the 'beyond Being' of Plato must mean a finite Being in some way beyond other finite beings" (Road to Reality, p. 24). But Rist appears to assume he and his readers share a common understanding of what it... (shrink)

Bu çalışma, Aristoteles ve Platon özelinde, “poiēsis” fiilinin iki farklı tarzda kavramsallaştırmasından doğan yapıca uzlaşmaz iki “tragedya” anlayışını irdeleme amacı taşımaktadır. Bunun için, Peri Poiētikēs Tekhnēs ile Politeia metinleri yol gösterici olarak seçilmiştir. Tartışmamızı “mimēsis” bağlamına yerleştirerek, bir yandan “poiēsis” etkinliğine diğer yandan ise “poiēsis” etkinliğinin gerçekleştiricisi olan “poiētēs”e yönelip, bu kavramların bahsedilen iki filozofun “sanat” ve “felsefe” kavrayışlarındaki yerini açmayı deniyoruz. Bu denemeyi ise tragedya bağlamında karşımıza çıkan fâil, fiil, münfâil hâl ve seyirci mefhumları üzerinden derinleştirmeye çalışıyoruz. Böylece, sunduğumuz (...) eleştirel değerlendirmelerden hareketle, aslında Aristoteles’in değil, fakat Platon’un “sanat”ın bir “tekhnē ” ve “poiētikē ” olarak asıl anlamını yakalamış olabileceğine dair bir ipucu bırakıyoruz. (shrink)

Abstrak: Dalam artikel ini penulis mengeksplorasi gagasan kota utama yang diajukan oleh Abu Nashr al-Farabi (870-950 M), seorang filsuf Muslim di abad ke-10. Gagasan al-Farabi mengenai kota utama banyak penulis ambil dari karya utamanya yang sangat terkenal, Mabdi r Ahl al-Madinah al-Fdhilah yang secara harafiah berarti “Dasar-dasar Pandangan Warga Kota Utama.” Pandangan al-Farabi dalam karya ini banyak dipengaruhi oleh dua filsuf Yunani, yakni Plato dan Aristoteles. Kota utama adalah kota yang warganya mengerti hakikat kebenaran (teoritis) dan juga memiliki kemampuan bertindak (...) secara moderat (tawassuth) dengan mempertimbangkan tempat, waktu, pelaku dan juga alasan mengapa hal itu perlu dilakukan (phronesis). Keutamaan ini bisa mengantarkan para warganya untuk mencapai kebahagiaan (al-sa’dah). Kebahagiaan adalah tujuan hidup yang paling utama dan paling tinggi bagi manusia. Bagi al-Farabi, dalam upaya mewujudkan kota utama, peran filsuf raja menjadi sangat penting karena dia yang akan mendidik para warga untuk mengerti dan bisa bertindak sesuai dengan nilai-nilai keutamaan. Kata-kata Kunci: Kota utama, kebahagiaan, emanasi, neoplatonisme, penyatuan, phronesis. Abstract: In this article I will explore al-Farabi’s idea of virtuous city. Abu Nashr Al-Farabi is a Muslim philosopher who lived in 870 to 950. The idea of virtuous city much refers to his master piece, Mabdi r Ahl al-Madnah al-Fdhilah, which literally means “the principles of the views of citizens in virtuous city.” Al-Farabi’s concept of virtuous city in this book is much influenced by two Greek philosophers, i.e. Plato and Aristoteles. The virtuous city is the city in which the virtuous citizens live. The virtuous citizens are those who understand the nature of truth and have virtuous character (phronesis). This virtue will carry the citizens to happiness (al-sa’ dah). The happiness is the ultimate goal for all human beings. According to al-Farabi, to make virtuous city happen, the role of philosopher-king is very important. He will teach and educate the people to understand the nature of truth and act in accordance with virtuous character. Keywords: Virtuous City, happiness, emanation, Neoplatonism, union, phronesis. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Heavy TrafficDenis DuttonIt was the Reverend Sidney Smith who said, “I never read a book before reviewing it; it prejudices a man so.” Thirty years ago that remark was still a joke. These days, it’s a downright plausible idea, one with a distinctly postmodern ring. If the objects of experience are nothing but constructions, inventions of our cultures and mind-sets, that must go as well for all the books (...) we read—including those books which urge this fact on us. To read them is to construct them, to write them for yourself. But wait—that can’t be a fact, because facts are just prejudices too. Takes your breath away to realize how far scholarship has come.These thoughts drifted through my mind reading The Traffic in Culture: Refiguring Art and Anthropology, edited by George E. Marcus and Fred R. Myers (University of California Press, $48.00 cloth, $17.95 paper). It comprises a long introduction plus eleven chapters which “explore the boundaries and affinities between art, anthropology, representation, and culture, casting a critical, ethnographic light on the art worlds of the contemporary West and the ways they give value to cultural form—in short, a “‘traffic’ in culture.” It is not easy to make out a consistent thread in the essays themselves. Carol Vance offers a fine discussion in the form of four small essays on censorship, the NEA, Jesse Helms, and so forth. There is no discernible connection with anthropology, and I cannot see why these pieces are included. Nancy Sullivan, described as a Ph.D. candidate in Fred R. Myers’s NYU anthropology department, struggles with her cumbersome account of the artworld in the last generation. Again, I can detect no hint of how anthropology has helped her understand the artworld. Hal Foster makes a cameo appearance of only a few pages, a kind of postmodern arabesque with lots of big words. Christopher B. Steiner revisits material [End Page 283] presented in his book, African Art in Transit, which is squarely in the field, and Steven Feld agonizes about appropriation of world music into commercial music business while telling some interesting tales about a radio program he produced of music from Papua New Guinea. The feminist Judith L. Goldstein does a late-capitalist, “late-postmodernist” job on women’s makeup, with much reliance on Fredric Jameson but no anthropology I can discern, despite the fact that she gave a version of it at an American Anthropological Association conference. If we really have reached “late-postmodernism” we can only be thankful. Molly H. Mullin’s account of the nineteenth- and early twentieth-century enthusiasm for American Indian artifacts, on the other hand, may begin with clichés about “élite responses to the rise of consumer capitalism,” but it soon settles down to a solid account of the people and problems of trying to achieve recognition of Indian handicrafts as art. This was made possible, we learn, by much devoted work from people who were multiculturalists before the word existed, white Americans whose actions were based on a love of Indian cultures and arts, rather than postcolonial theory and the school of resentment. All the issues of art vs. craft, the relation of tourism to artistic development, authenticity, and so on, were raised in the 1920s and 30s, with sophistication not often seen today.But to figure out how it all is supposed to tie together, we have to turn to the book’s explanatory introduction. This is so turgidly vague that when I was done I felt like invoicing the authors for my time. These pages are peppered with half-assertions I’d half want to dispute if their meaning were plainer, and a few that are plain enough to be flat-out wrong. Among many examples: “Ironically, the very category of ‘art’—as opposed to ‘the arts’—goes unexamined in its own hierarchies of sense, so that various forms of popular performance, in which disinterested contemplation does not necessarily reign supreme, are excluded.” Excluded? Notice that irritating passive voice: who, I’d like to know, has left popular performance unexamined and excluded? What are “hierarchies of sense”? The sentence carries no reference. In... (shrink)

Many languages grammatically mark evidentiality, i.e., the source of information. In assertions, evidentials indicate the source of information of the speaker while in questions they indicate the expected source of information of the addressee. This dissertation examines the semantics and pragmatics of evidentiality and illocutionary mood, set within formal theories of meaning and discourse. The empirical focus is the evidential system of Cheyenne (Algonquian: Montana), which is analyzed based on several years of fieldwork by the author.

В книге анализируются проблемы творчества с позиции новейших достижений когнитивной науки и неклассической эпистемологии. Предназначено специалистам по философии.

Despite the bad reputation of the legal profession, law remains king in America. A highly diverse society relies on the laws to maintain a working sense of the dignity and inviability of each individual. And a persistent element in contemporary debates is the fear that naturalistic theories of the human person will erode our belief that we have a dignity greater than that of other natural objects. Thus the endurance of the creation vs. evolution debate is due less to the (...) arguments of creationists, or to the continued influence of the book of Genesis, than to the reading of the evidence provided by Phillip E. Johnson of the University of California, Berkeley, Law School. (shrink)